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Abstract
Two types of legislation underlie cadaveric organ donations: pre-
sumed consent (PC) and informed consent (IC). In informed consent
countries, people are only donors when deceased if they registered to
do so while alive. Conversely, in presumed consent countries, anybody
is a potential donor when deceased. People have thus to register if they
do not want to donate their body. PC has always been perceived as
the “best” system for society in terms of organ donations whereas IC
is supposed to be more ethical. However, in both systems, the family
has a say, especially for the deceased who did not sign anything while
alive. Taking the family decision into account, we show that the pre-
vious results may be reversed. The diﬀerence between both systems
resides in the way an individual can commit to his/her will, eventually
against the opinion of his/her family. IC can dominate PC in terms
of organ donations whereas PC can be a more ethical system. In the
general case, two opposite eﬀects are at stake and the result depends
on the extent to which people stay in the default situation. We discuss
several causes of inactions (death taboo, procrastination, anticipated
regret,...) and their impact on both the individual and the family.
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11 Introduction
The increasing gap between supply and demand for organ donations has
raised doubt about a quick solution to the shortage of organs. Cadaveric
donations have been increasing slightly over the years and the importance
of the legislation has been seen as the main reason why some countries have
higher rates of donation (Abadie and Gay (2004); Gimbel and al. (2003)).
There are two main types of legislation: presumed consent and informed
consent. In informed consent countries, also known as opt-in countries,
people are only donors when deceased if they registered to do so while alive.
Conversely, in presumed consent countries, also called opt-out countries,
anybody is potentially a donor. People have to register if they do not want
to donate their body.
In the last few years the debate on organ donations has focused on legis-
lation.1 Spital (1996) and Mustarah (1998) have pointed out that switching
to a presumed consent law would increase the rate of organ donations, due
to the higher observed rate of donation in presumed consent countries (see
ﬁgure 12). The idea behind this result is that the presumed consent system
beneﬁts from the organs of donors that did not declare any preference for
donation while living. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) suggest that a switch
to a presumed consent legislation in the United States would increase dona-
tions by some additional thousands of donors per year.3 However, the fact
that someone does not register not to donate his/her body does not mean
that he/she agrees to be a donor. The society may thus take the organs of
someone “against” his/her will in the presumed consent system. Because
of this ethical and moral problem, the informed consent legislation may be
seen as better (Kennedy and Grubb (2000), National Health and Medical
Research Council (1997)).
These two points of view have been clearly expressed by the British Par-
liament when studying in January 2004 “The Organ Donation (Presumed
Consent and Safeguards) Bill” proposed by Parliamentarian Siobhain Mc-
1Another debate concerns the use of monetary incentives to increase the supply of
organs (Cohen, 1989; Becker, 1997; Becker and Elias, 2003).
2The informed consent curve was derived from the donation rates of the following
seven countries: Australia, Denmark, England, Germany, The Netherlands, USA and
Switzerland. The presumed consent curve was derived from the donation rates of the
following seven countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain.
3The default legislation is known in economics to play an important role (see Thaler
(2004) for an application to savings).
2Donagh. This bill was intended to switch from the actual IC system to the
PC system. On one hand, Dr. Michael Wilks, Chairman of the British Med-
ical Association’s Ethics Committee argues in favor of the presumed consent
system to increase the number of organ donations: “We must increase the
number of donors available and we believe that a system of presumed consent
with safeguards, will do this.” On the other hand, Health Minister Rosie
Winterton ruled out the Bill because of ethical problems of the presumed
consent system and said that “full consent must be obtained to use human
organs and tissue.”
Actually because full consent of the deceased is sometimes diﬃcult to
achieve, his/her family has a say in the decision of organ donations in both
systems. Doctors systematically ask the family before removing organs from
the deceased (May et al. (2000)). In case of refusal, the organs will not be
taken. Under the British Human Tissue Bill, voted in January 2004 after
the debate on the presumed consent system, doctors would no longer be
legally able to keep organs from dead patients without the full consent of
their families.
When debating the impact of the legislation, previous studies (Johnson
and Goldstein (2003), Mustarah (1998), Spital (1996)) never take into ac-
count the role of the family. The aim of this paper is on the contrary to
understand the impact of the family decision on cadaveric organ donations.
Taking the opinion of the family into account, we ﬁnd that, surprisingly, the
informed consent system may be preferable to the presumed consent one in
terms of organ donations. On the contrary, the informed consent system
may be less preferable when looking at the respect of the deceased’s will.
The idea behind this result is that both systems are equivalent when the
deceased does not take any decision while alive. In both systems, the ﬁnal
decision is the family’s. The diﬀerence resides in the way an individual can
commit his/her will, eventually against the opinion of his/her family. In
informed consent countries, he/she can register to donate his/her organs.
He/she can thus take a binding commitment with respect to donation. On
the contrary, in presumed consent countries, he/she can only register not
to donate his/her organs. He/she can only take a binding commitment
in favor of non donation. This commitment eﬀect pleads in favor of the in-
formed consent system as far as the number of organ donations is concerned.
This commitment eﬀect also explains why presumed consent countries cre-
ate donor cards when the family is involved in the decision process. It allows
individuals to commit to give their organs, which is positive for both ethics
and organ donations.
3However the default legislation may play a key role, as the family decision
is also intrinsically inﬂuenced by the default. In that case, two opposite
eﬀects play against each other. The dominant eﬀect hinges on the reason
why people do not to take any stance on organ donations. Several causes
of inactions can explain why the individual stays in the default situation.
On one hand, doctors stress the importance of death taboo: people do not
want to think about their death and what will or would happen to their
body when deceased. On the other hand, the economic literature has shown
the importance of procrastination, anticipated regret and loss aversion that
can partially explain why an individual does not take any decision regarding
organ donations. The family, contrary to the individual, has to decide once
and for all in a short amount of time and cannot postpone such a decision.
Ignorance, procrastination and death taboo thus appear to be less relevant
for the family. However, the family has a diﬃcult decision to take and faces
anticipated regret. It is thus possible that the family is inﬂuenced by the
default situation and procrastinates in the sense that they do not want to
take such an unpleasant decision.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops a model for pre-
sumed consent (PC) and informed consent (IC) without the family and
section 3 develops a model that takes into account the inﬂuence of the fam-
ily. The issues of death taboo and procrastination are addressed in section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 IC and PC without the family
Let ﬁrst consider a model of organ donations without taking into account
the decision of the family. We will suppose that an individual has a utility
ud if he/she donates his/her organs and a utility uk if he/she decides to keep
his/her organs. We note v = ud − uk the diﬀerence between these utilities.
If v > 0, he/she wants to donate his/her organs, whereas if v < 0 he/she
wants to keep them.
Figure 2 describes the two models. In the IC case, he/she keeps by
default his/her organs but can take the decision to donate them. Let c
be the cost of donating his/her organs. Similarly, in the PC case, he/she
donates by default his/her organs, but can take the decision to keep them
by paying a cost c.
In most countries, obtaining registration to donate or not organs is as
simple as sending a letter, an email or make a free phone call. As a con-
sequence, the cost c in the model is not a standard cost. It reﬂects the
4tendency to procrastination that people may have (Akerlof (1991), Madrian
and Shea (2001), Thaler and Benartzi (2004)). It may also represent the cost
doctors usually refer to. It is the moral cost individuals have to face when
thinking about their death and what will happen to their body (National
Health and Medical Research Council (1997)).
Proposition 1. There are more organ donations in PC systems than in IC
systems.
Proof: In the PC case, the individual will take the decision to keep
his/her organs if and only if v < −c. In the IC system, the individual will
take the decision to give his/her organs iﬀ c < v. Consequently, if c < v,
he/she donates his/her organs under both rules. If −c < v < c, he/she
donates his/her organs under the PC rule but keeps them in the IC case. If
v < −c, he/she keeps his/her organs under both rules. The PC system thus
dominates the IC one. 
Proposition 1 shows that in order to maximize the number of organs,
society wants to adopt the PC system. The diﬀerence between the two
systems comes from the fraction of people who would stay in the default
system whatever the rule is. In a PC system, these individuals give their
organs whereas they will keep them under the IC system.
It is also interesting to note that these people are the ones who do not
have a clear preference about the issue of organ donations. If giving his/her
organs is important for an individual, it is more likely that v would be
greater than the cost and this individual will register in an IC system to
give his/her organs.
The number of organs is not however the only criterium to evaluate both
systems. For ethical and moral reasons, society may also want to choose a
system that respects the “will” of individuals. Most religions think that
organ donation is morally acceptable only if the donor has given his/her
explicit consent.
Proposition 2. None of the two systems respects the will of the people who
do not register.
Proof: In the PC case, if −c < v < 0, the individual gives his/her
organs whereas he/she would like not to. In the IC case, if 0 < v < c, the
individual does not give his/her organs whereas he/she would like to. 
Proposition 2 shows that it is diﬃcult to choose a system that respects
the will of people when not expressed! Under PC rules, society may take
5the organs of some people against their “will”. Under IC rules, society may
not take the organs of some individuals that would like to give them.
The results of the two propositions above are the ones on which the
debate between PC and IC hinges. A recent example of such a debate
occurred in January 2004 when the British Parliament studied “The Organ
Donation (Presumed Consent and Safeguards) Bill”. The advocates of the
PC system argue that it increases the number of organ donations, which is
beneﬁcial to society because of the shortage of organs. The proponents of
the IC system use ethical reasons for arguing that it is unacceptable to take
the organs of a person if he/she does not explicitly agree.4
3 IC and PC with the family
Under the PC system (respectively the IC system) we cannot distinguish an
individual that has not thought about organ donations when alive or has
procrastinated (−c < v < c) and whose will is unknown, from an individual
that really want to (resp. not to) donate his/her organs (c < v (resp.
v < −c)). For that matter, in almost all countries, doctors ask for the
family decision before taking someone’s organs. Doctors always follow the
will of the family, even if in PC countries, they could legally take the organs
(May et al. (2000)). It is thus necessary, when comparing both systems, to
include the decision of the family.
We will suppose that the family has a utility u
f
d if they donate the organs
of the deceased and a utility u
f





diﬀerence and we suppose that v and vf are common knowledge. We ﬁnally
suppose in this part that there is no cost to the family to take its decision.
Figure 3 represents the game with the family. In both models, if the
individual decides to register, the family has no choice but to respect his/her
decision. If, on the contrary, the individual stays in the “default” situation,
the family takes the ﬁnal decision.5
4They however “forget” to mention that the IC system does not either respect the
“will” of some people that would like to donate their organs.
5This model is conformed for example to the decision process in the Netherlands (IC)
and in Belgium (PC). In most countries however, in both systems, the family can decide
not to respect the will of the deceased, even if he/she registered when alive. This event is
however rare. One can extend the model to let the family decide even when the deceased
had registered. If the family has a huge cost to change the decision of the deceased when
expressed, the conclusions will be very similar to the simpler model presented here.
6Proposition 3. If the family has the same preferences as the individual,
both systems are equivalent.
If the family can have diﬀerent preferences, there are more organ dona-
tions in the IC system than in the PC system.
Proof: If vf = v, the equilibrium in both systems is the same. The
individual stays in the “default” situation and the family takes the good
decision in the end.
If preferences can be diﬀerent, the analysis changes. In a PC system,
the individual registers if and only if v < −c and vf > 0 i.e. iﬀ he/she
does not really want to give his/her organs but the family wants to. In a
IC system, the individual registers if and only if v > c and vf < 0 i.e. iﬀ
he/she really wants to give his/her organs but the family does not want to.
As a consequence both systems are equivalent in all the situations except
if (v < −c,vf > 0) and (v > c,vf < 0) where the individual will donate
his/her organs in the IC system but not in the PC system.
The ﬁrst result is quite intuitive. If the family and the individual always
agree, individuals do not register and let the family take the good decision
when deceased.
This is however not what we observe as people do register in both sys-
tems6. Many reasons can explain that the value of the family diﬀers from
the value of the individual. The family can have their own preferences
and choose their decision by taking into account both their preferences and
the preferences of the individual. Doctors also complain about people not
speaking enough about this issue when alive and that the family has no idea
of the stance of the individual on organ donations (Rocheleau (2001)). In
that case, one can suppose that the family takes their decision using their
own valuation. The diﬀerence between the individual will and the family’s
opinion is a real concern. Recently, the British Parliament passed a Bill on
that subject and UK Transplant chief executive Sue Sutherland said: “The
Human Tissue Bill reinforces the importance of consent for donation but
makes it explicit that it is the wishes of the individual that should prevail.
Many people have found it diﬃcult to accept that relatives can overturn
those wishes and this Bill deals with those concerns”.
When taking into account the family decision, we surprisingly ﬁnd the
opposite of the usual claim. The IC system leads to more organ donations
6In 2003 for example, about 37% of the Dutch population have made a registration to
donate their organs (The Netherlands is an IC country.).
7than the PC system, because the argument of the model without the family
does not apply anymore. When an individual does not want to think about
his/her death or procrastinates (−c < v < c), he/she lets his/her fam-
ily decide for him/her. Both systems are thus equivalent for these agents.
However, the fact that the family can take the decision for the individual,
even when he/she has clear preferences concerning organ donations (v < −c
or v > c), has a perverse eﬀect when the family and the individual disagree.
Registering is a protection against the family and has a value of commit-
ment. In the IC system, the individual can register and commit to give
his/her organs. In the PC system, on the contrary, the individual can only
register to commit to keep his/her organs. This commitment eﬀect explains
why the IC system potentially leads to more organ donations.
Interestingly, most of the countries seem aware of this commitment prob-
lem and oﬀer the possibility to register as a donor in the PC system. Kluge
(1997), for example, asserts that the shortage of organ donations would
decrease if the donor card is used as a proof of donation to bypass some
families reluctant to donating. This donor card only exists to try to protect
the individual against his/her family.7
Corollary 1. Introducing a donor card in the PC system helps an individual
to give his/her organs when the family does not agree.
There are still more donations in the IC system than in the PC system
with donor cards.
One can argue that both systems are quite equivalent because an indi-
vidual can commit him/herself by writing a note saying that he/she does or
does not want to give his/her organs. Nonetheless this note will presumably
be in the possession of the family and this supposes that the family would
respect the will of the deceased. It is more diﬃcult to credibly commit with
a note than by going through an oﬃcial process. To restore the equivalence
between the two systems, one would like to allow an individual to have a
non-donor card in the IC system. Generally this is not the case.
The commitment problem faced by the agents when the family has a say
leads to another surprising result when looking at ethical and moral reasons.
Proposition 4. If the family has the same preferences as the individual,
both systems respect the will of all agents.
7Austria has a very strict PC system where the decision of the family is never taken
into account. In this country, no donor card exits.
8If the family can have diﬀerent preferences, none of the two systems
respects entirely the will of the people. The PC system with donor cards is
however more conform to the will of the individuals than the IC system.
Proof: If the family and the individuals have the same preferences, it is
clear that both systems respect the will of the deceased.
Suppose now that the family can have diﬀerent preferences. When −c <
v < c, the individual does not register and lets the family decide for him/her.
If the family does not have the same preferences, his/her will may not be
respected in both systems.
If v < −c and vf > 0, the individual does not want to give his/her organs
but the family does. In the PC system, he/she can register to keep his/her
organs, whereas in the IC system, he/she can not commit not to give his/her
organs. In that sense, the PC system is better than the IC system.
Finally, if v > c and vf < 0, the individual wants to give his/her organs
but the family does not. In the IC system, he/she can register to give his/her
organs, whereas in the PC system, he/she can not commit to give his/her
organs. This is not true with a donor card.
In conclusion, both the PC and the IC system do not respect the will
of individuals, but the PC system with a donor card is better than the IC
system.
This result is surprising for several reasons.
First, introducing the family seems worse in terms of ethical and moral
reasons than not asking for their decision as soon as some disagreements
exist between the family and the deceased. The will of individuals, who
have clear preferences towards organ donations, is not respected anymore
because of the commitment problem they face when disagreeing with their
families.
Second, the proponents of the IC system are usually deeply concerned
with taking the organs of someone against his/her will. Our result proves
that, actually, this event will happen more frequently in an IC system than
in a PC system and will strictly aﬀect people who would have taken a bind-
ing decision not to donate their organ donations if they had this opportunity.
Here, however, the family, and not society, is responsible for not implement-
ing the choice of the deceased. People usually consider that this is not as
ethically and morally unacceptable as when society decides.
Third, introducing a donor card is very important on ethical and moral
grounds as it allows to respect the will of the deceased. May et al. (2000)
argue that, even if the family does not consent to donation, respecting the
9documented wishes of a deceased to donate is not only morally permissible,
but morally required. Chouchau and Draper (2003) also argue about the
superiority of the PC system with a donor card when it comes to the respect
of the will of people.
When ethical and moral reasons are debated, it seems that politicians,
doctors, and religious people, all agree that the right thing to do is to respect
the will of the deceased. However, this may be questionable. A standard
hypothesis in economics is that the utility of dead people is zero. As a
consequence, the only utility that should matter is the family’s. In such a
case, none of the legislations is ethically and morally perfect. The “best”
system would be a system in which the individual has no say and in which
the family has all the power to take a decision regarding organ donations.
It is hard enough that a family member passed away. Perhaps, the family
should not have also to bear on top of that the fact that they must respect
the will of the deceased if his/her decision is painful for them. In a sense,
most countries maximize the utility of the living by giving them the ﬁnal
decision. Still, to reach that goal, the commitment eﬀect that exists in both
system should be eliminated.
4 Procrastination and death taboo
The previous models (with and without family) are two extreme cases of a
more general model where the family is also aﬀected by the default situation.
If the family bears a cost cf of not staying in the default situation, the model
without family (section 2) corresponds to cf = +∞ whereas the model with
family (section 3) corresponds to cf = 0. In the general case, the eﬀects
derived in the extreme cases are both at stake. Two opposite forces are
actually conﬂicting and each one could potentially be dominant. Figure 4
represents the equilibrium in the general case. Both systems are equivalent
except in three regions. In the middle region, taking a decision is too costly
for both the individual and the family. The choice directly comes from
the default situation. In such a case, the PC system dominates the IC
system. In the two other regions, the individual and the family want to
make a decision, but disagree. The commitment eﬀect is central here and
the IC system dominates the PC system. The total eﬀect is ambiguous and
depends on the values v and vf and on the costs c and cf. The choice of an
“optimal” system in a given country should thus depend on the behavior of
people regarding their death or the death of a relative.
10Let ﬁrst consider the situation of an individual. The blind acceptance
of the default by agents, also called status quo, has been pointed out to be
central even when strong reasons for change exist. Loss aversion, anticipated
regret and ignorance (Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Kahneman, Knetch
and Thaler (1991); Laibson (1998); Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)) are
among the explanations that causes inaction. Related to this point is the is-
sue of procrastination. Strictly speaking, procrastination is to keep delaying
something that must be done, often because it is unpleasant. Procrastina-
tion has been studied in economics in order to better understand inadequate
savings or organizational failures (Akerlof 1991). In our model, the lack of
registrations can be interpreted as procrastination, hence creating an impor-
tant cost to the individual to register. Recent papers have emphasized the
importance of procrastination in a default system: Choi et al. (2003) and
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) show that default options have a remarkable
impact on household ’choices’ in term of savings, for opting out of a default
is costly and people’s tendency to procrastinate. Madrian and Shea (2001)
also study the eﬀect of the default system on savings. They found that 86%
of the employees hired after the implementation of an automatic participa-
tion rule stay in the default savings plan designed by the company. On the
opposite, only half of the employees hired before the automatic enrollment
take part in the plan. In the organ donation process, procrastination can
be modelled by an important cost for the individual who wants to delay his
decision.
The other explanation expressed by doctors to understand why people do
not register is death taboo (National Health and Medical Research Council
(1997)). Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to have an objective measure of death
taboo. A good proxy can be the willingness of people to let the family
know or not about their post mortem decisions. In Quebec8 for instance,
only 50% of the population writes a testament. In 4 cases out of 5 this
testament is registered by a notary. Moreover these testaments usually deal
with the succession but very few people let speciﬁc instructions regarding
their funeral. These ﬁgures underline the importance of death taboo. People
do not like to think about their death and to what will happen to their
body once deceased. This argument also emphasizes that the cost for the
individual may be important.9
8These ﬁgures were given to us by the Chambre des Notaires du Quebec.
9This cost may vary by individual. The richer, the older and the more educated an
individual is, the more likely s/he is to write a testament and therefore to think ahead
about their death.
11The family, contrary to the individual, has no choice but to think about
the situation and take a decision quickly after the death of their relative.
They have to decide once and for all in a short amount of time and cannot
postpone this decision. Ignorance, procrastination and death taboo thus
appear to be less relevant for the family which is expected to have a smaller
cost cf than the cost c to the individual. Nevertheless, this cost may not be
zero. The family has a diﬃcult decision to take and faces anticipated regret.
It is thus possible that the family procrastinates in the sense that they do
not want to take such an unpleasant decision. Moreover, in PC countries, by
refusing to donate the organs, the family “kills” someone who should have
lived under the strict application of the law. Such a decision, under the
pressure of medical doctors, may be hard to take. In IC countries, on the
contrary, members of the family have the law on their side when deciding
not to give organs. If such eﬀects are at stake, the cost for the family may
not be negligible.
Given the expected structure of the costs (high cost for the individual
and smaller cost for the family), one crucial element is the distribution of
the preferences (v,vf). If the individual and the family have well correlated
preferences, the PC system may be a better one. As already mentioned,
this is not necessarily the case. Because of the death taboo, the family often
has no idea of the will of the deceased. This absence of communication on
organ donations can lead to more disagreements between the choice of both
the individual and the family. For these reasons, when death taboo is an
important issue, it gives some arguments for a country towards choosing the
IC system. Furthermore, the family is known to be much more reluctant
than the deceased to tackling the issue of organ donations.10 It is thus
possible that in a PC country, an important number of people would like
to give their organs but cannot commit themselves against their family,11
which leads to the conclusion than the IC system could be better in terms
of organ donations.
Our results show that the comparison between both systems is more
complicated than usually thought and give an argument in favor of the IC
system in terms of organ donations. It would be interesting to have data by
10Verzijden and Schothorst (2003) for example state that 86% of the Dutch population
would donate their organs. However, for the 63% of them that did not register, the family
refuses in 80% of the cases to give the deceased’s organs.
11In theory, we have seen that this problem could be solved by a donor card. Countries
however do not have a registry for people who ask for a donor card. Having a donor card
is less binding for the family than registering to give his/her organs.
12country to estimate precisely what the diﬀerent eﬀects are in each country.12
This will require to have data on the decision of both the individual and the
family that countries have just begun to collect.
5 Conclusion
The introduction of the family in the process of decision for organ dona-
tion can reverse the intuitive comparison between presumed consent and
informed consent legislations. Registering to be a donor in informed con-
sent countries is a credible commitment against his/her family in favor of
donation, whereas registering in a presumed consent country is a commit-
ment not to donate. This commitment eﬀect can lead to the superiority of
the IC system in terms of organ donations. Another consequence of that
eﬀect is the introduction of donor cards in PC countries to prevent families
from refusing donation if the deceased was willing to donate his/her body.
When looking at ethical and moral reasons, our results show the superiority
of a PC system with a donor card to respect people’s will.
The default situation may still play an important role and, in general,
two opposite eﬀects are in the balance. The result depends on the extent
to which people stay in the default situation. We discussed several causes
of inactions (death taboo, procrastination, anticipated regret...) and their
impact on both the individual and the family.
Ronald Davis, Editor of the British Medical Journal, writes in his edi-
torial in 1999, “Both the American and the British medical associations are
looking at ways of increasing organ donation, including presumed consent.
While the ethics of presumed consent continue to be debated, policymakers
can and should move forward with mandated choice, which has the poten-
tial to narrow, if not eliminate, the gap between organ supply and demand.”
(Davis (1999)). Our results show that the arguments on which the debate
between PC and IC systems are based may not be as accurate as expected
when the family decision is taken into account.
12Empirical studies that estimate the eﬀect of the legislation on organ donations (Abadie
and Gay (2004), Gimbel and al. (2003)) use cross countries data. They usually ﬁnd that
PC countries have higher rates of donation than IC countries.
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Figure 4: Comparison of both systems in the general case with family
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